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Exchange rates and the European 
business cycle 
An application of a quasi-empirical two-country 
model 
Pieter J F G Meulendijks and Dick B J Schouten 
A quasi-empirical symmetric two-country model is used to analyse the case in which 
country A, as an anchor country, pursues price stability as its main priority, whereas 
country B stresses exchange rate stability. Problems will arise, in particular for the 
latter country, when in country A contractionary tax and monetary policy measures 
are taken after expansionary wage impulses have occurred. In addition, the analysis 
should shed light upon the recent problems of a European stagnation within an 
unstable European Monetary System. The model, presented as an exempl i  g r a t i a  in 
order to promote quasi-empirical modelling, intefrates the q theory of investment 
with the approach of a portfolio choice in which both domestic and foreign agents 
spread their non-human wealth over imperfectly substitutable domestic and forei#n 
share capital, domestic and foreign government bonds, domestic and foreign treasury 
bills, domestic and foreign time deposits and domestic and foreign money. Within 
the framework of fixed or floating exchange rates, rigid labour markets, sticky price 
and/or flexible price regimes in the #oods markets, due account is taken of capital 
accumulation, government debt and current account dynamics. The analysis shows 
why politicians have fundamental reasons to question the usefulness of a European 
Monetary Union within a framework of fixed exchange rates. The pros of the latter 
system are probably outweighed by the cons. 
Keywords: Exchange rates; European business cycle; Quasi-empirical two-country model 
In  this paper  a quasi-empirical symmetric  two-count ry  
model  is used to analyse the case in which country  A, 
as an anchor  country,  pursues price stability as its 
main priority, while count ry  B stresses exchange rate 
stability. Problems will arise, in part icular  for the latter 
country,  when in count ry  A cont rac t ionary  tax and 
monetary  policy measures are taken after expansionary 
wage impulses have occurred. In addition, the present 
article should shed light upon  the recent problems of  
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European  stagnation within an unstable European  
Mone ta ry  System. 1 
The organizat ion of  the paper is as follows. The 
next section introduces a symmetric two-country  
model. In the quasi-empirical case in question it 
represents two composi te  countries (regions) into 
1 For some years now growing attention has been paid to quasi- 
empirical modelling for policy analysis; see for instance van Els 
([13], pp 133-47) and Meulendijks ([7], pp 1-28). In spite of the 
fact that literature and conferences pay more attention to quasi- 
empirical models, this method of modelling still meets criticism 
because "there seems to be no attempt at estimation'. Instead, as is 
argued, 'the approach taken is one of imposing plausible values on 
the parameters of a theoretical model. While this approach can be 
used to generate useful insights into the operation of that particular 
model it gives no clue as to how well this model fits the historically 
generated data, or how well it performs relative to alternative 
non-quasi-empirical models'. An adequate response to such criticism 
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which the European Community is hypothetically 
divided. Country A represents the composite anchor 
country and is called 'Germany'. Country B represents 
the other composite country and is called 'the UK'. 
The third section falls into six parts. One contains the 
formulation of the three aims of this article (1) to 
analyse the theoretical case in which country A, as an 
anchor country, pursues price stability as its main 
priority, while country B stresses exchange rate 
stability; (2) to shed light upon the complex case of 
the recent downswing of the European business cycle; 
and (3) to offer a theoretical solution for the necessary 
upturn of the European business cycle in the near 
future. Attention is then focused on the downswing of 
the European business cycle initiated by German 
economic policy within the framework of fixed 
exchange rates. The UK is then introduced as a 
traditional trading partner of Germany, and it is ex- 
plained why the policy measures, initiated by Germany, 
will also cause recessive effects for the UK, with the 
latter country becoming a victim of the German policy. 
We then describe why and how a devaluation of the 
UK pound sterling, whether or not consciously 
effectuated by monetary policy making, may stop the 
process of negative growth. Two possibilities for 
effectuating a devaluation of the English pound are 
discussed. One of them consists of a successful 
speculative action against the UK pound. The policy 
is that, in comparison with econometric models, quasi-empirical 
models are more efficient tools for medium- and long-term policy 
analysis but, of course, not for short-term forcasting purposes. The 
quasi-empirical framework should enable its users to simulate values 
for instrumental variables or impulses and for target variables or 
effects which have only to be 'acceptable' fits of the historically 
generated data in the qualitative sense of the word. It appears that, 
apart from forecasting purposes, quasi-empirical models are useful 
alternatives to traditional macroeconometric models for policy 
analysis. As has already been stated, this is particularly true for 
medium- and long-term analysis because little attention is paid to 
lag structures. Therefore the quasi-empirical models are small, 
transparent and allow for an easy interpretation and comprehensi- 
bility of the results. Besides, when the basic version of a quasi- 
empirical model is relatively large it can easily be reduced to a 
relatively small one, as we will show in the present paper. The reason 
is that the analytical structure of the quasi-empirical model heavily 
draws on Tinbergen [10] with the exception that this author and 
his followers merely formulate their endogenous and exogenous 
variables in absolute terms, whereas in the present quasi-empirical 
model variables are formulated as deviations from a trend. Moreover, 
in general, the quasi-empirical models show a large feasibility to 
investigate alternative economic mechanisms and/or model structures. 
Last, but not least, quasi-empirical models show a high degree of 
flexibility for theoretical innovations without firm empirical repre- 
sentation, exactly because these models are calibrated and not  
estimated (see the incorporation of Brainard-Tobin's [ 1] portfolio/ 
q-investment approach in the present paper). Due to their strong 
empirical content relating to specific economies, a sensitivity analysis 
of the major coefficients of the quasi-empirical models cannot be 
avoided. Therefore we will discuss in Appendix 2 the robustness of 
the qualitative results of the presently used two-country model. 
scheme for an upturn of the European business 
cycle is then discussed. 
The last part first describes the long-term effects of a 
permanent (too) high level of the labour income share 
in the case of rigid labour markets in Germany and in 
the UK. Within the framework of flexible exchange 
rates it will be shown how the central banks in both 
countries may successfully take price stabilization 
policy measures. However, both countries will remain 
confronted with equally negative extra rates of growth 
of production and employment. Thus, the UK will not 
be in a position to protect itself from the negative 
effects of the German policy measures, in spite of a 
flexible exchange rate system. 
Second, the long-term effects of a permanent low 
level of the labour income share in the case of rigid 
labour markets are discussed. Under these circum- 
stances, both countries will still be the gainer by a 
deliberate policy mix of moderated wages, tax de- 
creases and M1 expansions, initiated by the German 
authorities. Within the framework of flexible exchange 
rates the central banks in both countries may take 
price-stabilization policy measures successfully once 
again. But in the latter case they will remain 
confronted with equally positive extra rates of growth 
of production and employment. 
The fourth section concludes the paper and stresses 
the benefits of a flexible exchange rate system in the 
case of rigid EC labour markets. Flexible exchange 
rates can play a very useful role in mitigating the 
downward movement of real welfare in the downswing 
of the European business cycle. Moreover, they may 
play a useful role in lowering the EC inflation rates 
in the event of an upturn of the European business 
cycle. 
Appendix 2 deserves special mention. For, in spite 
of the fact that literature and international conferences 
pay more attention to quasi-empirical models (see also 
note (1)), this method of modelling still meets criticism 
because 'there seems to be no attempt at estimation'. 
However, in the present paper, in particular in 
Appendix 2 and notes 1 and 2, efforts are made to 
gain more sympathy for the relatively strong legitimacy 
of quasi-empirical modelling. 
Nevertheless, the main aim of the present analysis 
is to show why politicians have fundamental reasons 
to question the usefulness of a European Monetary 
Union within a framework of fixed exchange rates. 
The pros of the latter system are probably outweighed 
by the cons. 
The symmetric two-country model 
The basic version of the model to be applied in the 
following section consists of over a hundred equations 
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and endogenous variables and has been evolved in 
Meulendijks's Dutch-language study [5]. The sym- 
metric model is at present significantly reduced. The 
theoretical basis of the model links more closely to 
a mix of Meade's I-4] traditional capital-immobility 
and Mundell-Fleming's 1-3, 9] perfect capital mobility 
approaches as well as to Brainard-Tobin's 1-1] portfolio/ 
q-investment approach. Moreover, Miller-Salmon's 18] 
idea of the Stackelberg leader framework to model the 
interaction of economic policies between two countries 
has been used. 2 
In Meulendijks's [5] study economic modelling of various concepts 
of openness and mobility plays a dominant role. The author's 
approach stands at the crossroads of two lines of thought. Following 
the first line, he questions the significance of the degree of integration 
of international goods markets by a comparison of the spillover 
effects of unilaterally taken policy actions in large open countries 
(for instance Germany) and in small open economies (for instance 
the Netherlands), respectively. Following the second line of argu- 
ment, the author examines the impact of a lower versus higher 
degree of financial integration on the effects, particularly the 
'spillover' effects of unilateral policy actions. For both purposes, 
alternative closed economy, small open economy, and symmetric 
two-country models are used. All of them incorporate alternative 
possibilities for the saving assumption, price regimes in the home 
and foreign goods markets, government debt and balance of 
payments dynamics, capital accumulation, perfect and imperfect 
substitutability between home and foreign goods as well as between 
home and foreign assets, labour market rigidity and fixed as well 
as floating exchange rates. The author confirms the significance of 
a higher versus lower degree of international capital mobility, but 
this conclusion only holds in the short term and in the event of 
imperfect substitutability between home and foreign assets as 
described, for instance, in Tobin's portfolio balance framework. In 
addition to Meade's capital immobility I-4] approach, the Mundell- 
Fleming assumption of perfect international financial capital mobility 
has been investigated. However, both these approaches should be 
rejected because the capital-immobility assumption as well as the 
assumption of perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign 
assets are in flagrant contradiction with day to day reality. From 
the foregoing review it will be clear that the theoretical basis of the 
Dutch-language study and the present paper link closely to the 
mainstream literature on international economics and the strategic 
interaction of interdependent economies. In particular Meade [4], 
Mundell [9], Miller and Salmon [8] were main source of inspiration. 
Besides this, the present paper incorporates a number of financial 
assets into the theoretical framework and draws very strongly on 
Tobin's q-investment theory. In particular two papers were helpful: 
Brainard and Tobin 1-1] and Tobin 1-11]. For some people the model 
used may seem overly complicated, because these innovations may 
seem to play almost no role in deriving the central results of the 
present paper, Perhaps, these results can be demonstrated easily 
.using less complicated models including Mundell's two country 
version of the IS-LM model. So, why complicate the model 
unnecessarily? First, in a main part of the meanstream models 
like Mundelrs two-country IS-LM model the microeconomic 
foundation of the investment and interest equations is rather 
primitive. If these less complicated models had been used various 
medium- and long-term results obtained would be quite different 
from those which have been derived in the present paper. In 
particular, significantly different results are obtained with respect 
to capital accumulation, government debt, current and capital 
account dynamics. The validity of the latter conclusion has been 
proved in the Dutch-language study. Second, the 'qualitative' 
simulations reported in the present paper are entirely compatible 
with the recent day to day data with regard to the economic 
performance of Western Europe after the German reunification; see 
the conclusion of Appendix 2. 
Variables are formulated as deviations from a trend. 
This trend should not be considered as being a random 
average path of the economy in the period under 
investigation. On the contrary, the initial situation of 
the trend obeys the rules of real and monetary growth 
theory. Whereas Meulendijks's version follows the rules 
of a positive steady-state growth, in the present model 
the case of a stationary state is postulated. Using the 
latter situation as a point of reference, the model at 
hand stays close to what is common in the international 
literature. 3 
Before engaging in a short discussion of some 
particular characteristics of the model at hand, a few 
additional remarks are in order. 
The two-country model can be split up into the 
country A model and the country B model. Impulses 
and effects are measured in percentages as deviations 
from a stationary equilibrium; X_~ and 'balance- 
variables' are measured in percentage-terms of equili- 
brium gross value-added in enterprises at equilibrium 
market prices (GVAE). By definition, T ' = Y ° - - Y b ;  
= E a -  E b etc holds. Upper case letters denote nominal 
values, lower case letters denote volumes, prices and 
other variables. 
The following definitions are also important for 
understanding the meaning of the variables in the 
model: 
= actual absolute value 
~0 = absolute value on stationary trend path 
x = 100 ( ~ -  ~o) 
:~o 
= percentage of the cumulated extra rate of growth 
= actual rate of growth 
~o = (zero) trend rate of growth 
Ax = ( x -  x_ 1) ~ x -  ~o = extra rate of growth 
Appendix 1 contains the numerical assumptions about 
the ratios and elasticities for the reference situation of 
the postulated stationary equilibrium. Insofar as the 
symbols used are not explained in the present section, 
they are interpreted in this appendix. 
It goes without saying that the complexity of the 
model used in this paper makes an analytical solution 
almost intractable. Nevertheless, in Appendix 2, we will 
establish the most relevant final equation of the 
symmetric two-country model in order to perform a 
3 The (inter)national accounting identities (balance sheets) of the 
reference situation, including the non-monetary sector as well as 
the financial relationships between the banks, the central bank, the 
government and the private non-banking sector are stated for both 
countries in Meulendijks and Sehouten [6]. By aggregating the 
two-country model the dosed model of the European economy can 
be derived together with the numerical values of its accounting 
identities and its ratios for the reference situation of the postulated 
stationary equilibrium. 
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sensitivity analysis for the short-term elasticity of a wage 
change with respect to the rate of unemployment (/~k). 
In order to parry other objections to the coefficient 
specific characteristic of the present exercise, Appendix 
2 also discusses the sensitivity results with regard to 
the capital-labour elasticity of substitution coefficient 
(~b) and the behavioural parameter of the competitive 
price elasticity (r/). 
The country A model 
a suffixes are omitted; the country B model is analogous 
to the country A model. 
Gross value-added in enterprises (GVAE) 
Y=#C +e,hlb + X~+ S ~ (1) 
where (C), (Ib), (X__a), and (Sn) are private consumption, 
gross investment, autonomous public sector expenditure 
(percentage of GVAE) and the balance on current 
account at current prices (percentage of GVAE) 
respectively. 
Private consumption: 
C=~(,(Y + w'-t t)+(1 - ~(,)Y 
o r  
1 ro (2) 
C= ( Y + w ' - q )  9 
in which (w'), (h), (ro/~) are the labour income 
share, the additional tax rate on wage income and 
the long-term real interest rate respectively. 
Consumption is determined by disposable wage and 
transfer income ( Y + w ' - h )  and by consumption by 
non-wage income earners (CR= Y=-ro / f ) .  Apart 
from other social benefits, disposable transfer income 
consists of disposable unemployment payments and 
disposable civil service wages. They are received from 
the public sector but implicitly paid by wage tax 
revenues from the private sector. The additional wage 
income tax rate (h) explicitly depends on rational 
tax-policy measures with respect to the public sector 
financial deficit: see Equation (16). As regards the 
non-wage income earners, the underlying assumption 
is that they spend more on consumption (CR) if 
national welfare (Y) increases (or if the long-term real 
interest rate (ro/} ~) decreases). 
Gross investment = Stock value of  share capital 
As we suppose for simplicity's sake ( =  ~i,/k, it follows 
from Equations (4) and (5) that 
I b = K* (3) 
where 
~" w"~ K * - I ~ q ~ ( Y - ( I _ ~ , )  ] 
+ ~ E2(E- pw)- ( ? -  pw)] 
1 
+ _ _  [2(E b _ p~) _ (rb _ p~)] 
1+~o 
is the reduced-form equation of the monetary sector 
in which ( E = E a - E  b) and (]>= Y ° -  yb) are M1 stock 
of money and GVAE differences between the two 
countries. (Pw) and (p~) are the nominal exchange rates 
of country A and country B respectively. Note that 
(pw) = -(p~). 
The latter two equations integrate the q theory of 
investment with the approach of a portfolio choice 
between imperfectly substitutable financial assets 
within each country as well as across countries. The 
first equation simply expresses the main channel of 
monetary transmission to the real sector. The second 
equation draws on Meulendijks [5] and implies the 
reduced form of the asset demand and supply 
equations of the monetary sector. It explains the stock 
value of share capital ie the capital stock market value 
(K*). Domestic agents implicitly spread their non- 
human wealth over imperfectly substitutable domestic 
and foreign share capital (K*), domestic and foreign 
government bonds (O), domestic and foreign treasury 
bills (_Q_a), domestic and foreign time deposits (Q) and 
domestic and foreign money (E). Foreign agents 
behave like domestic agents. (Note that suffixes are 
omitted.) Asset demand decisions depend on the 
various rates of return, on the income/non-human 
wealth ratio as well as on a certain degree of 
home preference (a=0.5; ~0 = 1). 
Accumulation of  capital goods 
= ~ (I~ - k_ 1 - Px) Ak (4) 
By definition the extra rate of growth of the stock of 
capital goods is positively related to the difference 
between the cumulated extra rates of growth of gross 
investment and the actual stock of capital goods (at 
the beginning of the current period = at the end of the 
foregoing period (k_ 1)) respectively. The actual stock 
of capital goods will rise when actual gross investment 
exceeds the volume of the scrapping of technically 
obsolete capital goods. 
Tobin's q type of  oross investment 
Ak = ~(K* - k_ 1 -Px) (5) 
The main channel of monetary transmission to the 
38 Economic Modelling 1995 Volume 12 Number 1 
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real sector is Tobin's q, which means that in the present 
model the difference between the capital-stock market 
value and its replacement value is an important 
determinant of gross investment. There are many ways 
to explain the Tobin's q transmission (Meulendijks 
[5]). Besides, as is mentioned in the literature (see for 
instance, van Els [13]), there is as yet very little 
empirical knowledge about the accelerator (0. This is 
probably due to a lack of information from the 
National Office of Statistics. In order to justify the use 
of Tobin's q in the present model where it has a clear 
impact on the analysis results, we may quote a recent 
Dutch study in which the empirical actuality in the 
Netherlands of the q-theory of investment has been 
confirmed (Driehuis and Mulder [2]). 
Balance on current account and at current prices 
(percentage of G VAE) 
Sb = -/)fly ~ -- (2q -- 1)/~(/~y -- p~) (6) 
where (~) and (P=Py-Pw) are production differences 
between the two countries and the terms of trade 
respectively. 
Total balance of payments (percentage of GVAE) 
S, = 0 = ( 2 a -  1)Sb-- (1 --a)(~+oS)~(T'--p~) 
+(1 -- a)(~ + 03 +:~-- ~oe)2a 
× [ -  2(AE- Apw) + (AT'- Apw)] (7) 
The latter equation draws on Meulendijks [5]. In the 
present case, however, the yield on share capital if*), 
the real interest rate on public sector debt fro) and the 
short-term real interest rate ff~) are assumed to be 
equal in absolute value on the stationary trend path. 
Thus, the average rate of return ff = ~* = fo = ~q). 
International capital movements are free, but inter- 
national capital mobility is imperfect because of a 
certain degree of home preference. The nominal 
exchange rate is flexible and follows from the foreign 
currency market equilibrium of the non-monetary 
sectors (Su = 0). Even so, its value can be stabilized by 
the monetary authorities to a certain degree by 
influencing the M1 stock of money; see Equation (21). 
Thus, under certain circumstances, the nominal ex- 
change rate may be fixed. 
Price of output enterprises 
py = ~ ( y -  y') (8) 
in which (y') is production capacity. 
In the goods market we distinguish two alternative 
regimes, the sticky price regime (8 = 1) and the flexible 
price regime (~ = 0o). In both cases price of output of 
enterprises depends on the utilization rate of produc- 
tion capacity. In the sticky price model, production 
may deviate from the level of production capacity. In 
the flexible price model, production instantaneously 
equals production capacity. 
Volume of output enterprises is by definition 
y = Y -  py (9) 
(Inefficient) employment in enterprises: 
l=y (10) 
where (1) is employment. For simplicity's sake, labour 
productivity ( y - l )  is assumed to remain unchanged. 
Production capacity of enterprises 
1(" w' y ' = k - x - 0 ~ _ ~  (11) 
On the supply side of the goods market, productive 
capacity is positively related to the stock volume of 
capital goods (at the beginning of the current period = at 
the end of the foregoing period) and negatively related 
to real labour coSts per unit of output in enterprises 
(w'). Imperfect substitution between the two factors of 
production is postulated. 
Price of expenditure categories 
px=py-fi([~y-pw) (12) 
The price of commodities is homogeneous with respect 
to the output price and the price of imports (in 
domestic currency terms). 
Yield on share capital 
7r* r 1~, = - - - - ~ w ' - r *  (13) 
By definition yield on share capital equals the 
difference between nominal profits in enterprises and 
the capital stock market value. 
Long-term real and short-term real interest rates 
r o = [0  - a{2(E - Pw) - ( Tz- Pw)} 
b b b b . 
- 2 ( E  - Pw)  + ( Y  - P~,)].~0 
r q = [Q _ a{2(E- p~) -  (~ ' -  Pw)} 
_ 2(E b _ p~) + ( yb _ p~)]:tp (14) 
where (O) and (Q) are the stocks of government bonds 
and time deposits respectively. These two equations 
draw on Meulendijks's portfolio subsystem [5]. The 
long-term real interest rate equals the real interest 
rate on public sector long-term debt (government 
bonds). The short-term real interest rate equals the 
real interest rate on the public sector short-term debt 
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(Treasury bills). It also equals the real interest rate on 
time deposits. 
Public sector financial deficit including interest 
payments on public debt (percentage of GVAE) 
- r g  = g a g  +  aQ, = x _ , -  - + 
- f R ~ F ( Y - l - ~  w ' ) + t b ~ O + ~ )  (15) 
This relation implicitly states that short-term lending 
by the public sector ({2,) is by balance for nothing. 
If rational tax policy is defined as keeping the 
financial deficit on a constant level 
-F =0 
the additional tax functions read as follows. 
The additional tax rate on wage income (percentage of 
private sector primary wage income) 
, 1 
h=O.5w + ~X__ a (16) 
The additional rate of taxes on non-wage income 
(percentage of disposable non-wage income) 
t'R= - 4 w ' - 2  E (17) 
3 3 
with respect to the rate of employment. Assuming a 
rigid labour market at home and abroad by setting 
(ilk=0), this augmented Phillips-curve relation is 
reduced to 
pz=py+ y - l + ~ h + p t  
or, by definition, to 
w ' - -s t t+/5=pi=~w + 
Nominal wages are determined by output prices, 
labour productivity, shifting effects of the burden of 
an additional wage taxation and an autonomous wage 
term, which represents the influence of wage policy 
adopted by the labour market parties. Apart from the 
latter three determinants, this equation implicitly 
states that the price of expenditure categories and the 
terms of trade are absorbed in the nominal wage 
formation. 
Labour income share equals real labour costs per worker 
in enterprises 
w ' = p t - p y - y + l = w y  (19) 
This is because labour productivity does not change; 
see Equation (10). Moreover, by definition, it reads: 
Originally, only the autonomous expenditure impulses 
initiated by the public sector are financed by the 
additional wage-income tax rate: 
1 
t,= 
whereas interest payments on public debt as well as 
a fall in non-wage taxes, in consequence of a rise in 
real labour costs per unit of output in enterprises, are 
financed by the additional non-wage tax rate: 
8 w, 2 E 
3 3 
However, the latter tax policy would not be rational 
because it would imply a double non-wage-income 
squeeze in the event of a rise in the real labour-income 
share. Therefore we introduce (0.5w') in the additional 
wage-tax-rate function in order to change the sign of 
the labour-income-share variable in the additional 
non-wage-tax-rate function. 
Wage and salary bill per worker in enterprises 
Ap: = Apy + A y -  AI + sAtt + Ap_I 
÷ 0.7(Apt - Apy - Ay + AI)_ ~ +/~,l_ 
-- 0.7(eAtt + Apt)_ 1 (18) 
where fl~ is the short-term elasticity of a wage change 
Real waoe per worker in enterprises 
wx = wy +/2(py- Pw) (20) 
M1 stock of money (E) is made up of speculative 
money: 
(Es) 
and transaction money: 
(ET) 
Thus: 
E = BEL +_Q_a + Speculative profits 
I E ~ 1 
=1E'+22 T= E,+-Y2 (21) 
where (BEL) and (~,a) are the central bank M 1 policy 
and the public sector short-term lending policy 
respectively. Transaction money equals gross value- 
added in enterprises. Thus, the velocity of circulation 
of transaction money remains constant. 
( M2-M1) stock of money consists in time deposits ( Q ) 
Q = ~,a + Speculative profits (22) 
Note that time deposits (Q) are influenced by the total 
short-term lending to the public sector (Qa) and by the 
speculative profits, but not by the central bank M1 
policy (BEL). 
40 Economic Modelling 1995 Volume 12 Number 1 
Exchange rates and the European business cycle: P J F G Meulendijks and D B J Schouten 
Importance of exchange rates to the 
European business cycle 
Formulation of the problem 
In an earlier study on the European integration 
process from EC to EMU a centralization of EC policy 
making was recommended (Meulendijks [5]). Fully 
autonomous national policy making should be for- 
bidden. However, there are practical as well as 
theoretical reasons why a national policy decision unit 
of an EC country will take unilateral wage, budgetary 
or monetary policy measures, notwithstanding their 
disastrous effects on the economic performance of 
other EC countries. 
What may happen if this recommendation of 
cooperation cannot be pursued by the different 
national decision making authorities will be demon- 
strated by analysing the recent problems of a European 
stagnation within an unstable European Monetary 
System. During the last two years this instability came 
to the surface: the European foreign currency market 
was in severe turmoil. Germany and the UK played 
leading roles in this economic political drama. Specu- 
lative agents were given a great deal of room on the 
exchange markets and, as usual, politicians and 
bankers viewed this situation as an immoral one. One 
of the questions to be discussed concerns the appro- 
priateness of this point of view. 
In the following parts of this section, an analysis 
will be given of the complex case of the recent 
downswing of the European business cycle, in which 
two large open countries, namely Germany and the 
UK have probably played a dominant part. Using the 
symmetric two-country model above, results will be 
derived which correspond strikingly with the poor 
economic performance Western Europe has recently 
been confronted with (see Tables 1 and 2). Theoretically 
speaking, the EC decision units concerned can be 
offered a solution in order to create the necessary 
upturn of the European business cycle in the near 
future. At least politicians can learn from what the 
reversed signs of the expansionary impulses and their 
negative results have to tell (see Tables 3 and 4). 
The downswing of the European business cycle 
The attention is focused on a (large) open country and 
for the quasi-empirical case in question this composite 
country is called 'Germany'. As is usual in capitalist 
countries, in this economy the wage, budgetary and 
monetary policy measures are uncoordinated. Any of 
the three important decision units has its proper 
responsibility. The two unions of the labour market 
decide on the levels of (collectively agreed) nominal 
wage contracts. The government consequently decides 
on the tax rate levels aiming at a desired level of 
expenditures by the public sector and the desired 
financial deficit. Finally, the German Bundesbank 
takes monetary policy measures aiming at stable 
production prices. 
Starting, for the present analysis, from a stationary 
state of the German economy, nominal wages are 
increased as a consequence of German unification. If 
the nominal wage is increased in Germany while the 
price of production and labour productivity are 
maintained at a constant level, this implies an increase 
of the real labour costs per unit of output in 
enterprises. Thus, Germany is confronted with an 
autonomously induced wage impulse (see Table 1, 
Germany, column (a)). It will affect the production 
capacity of enterprises negatively. 4 If production were 
also lowered (or perhaps maintained at a constant 
level), but initially at a lower speed as production 
capacity is decreasing, prices would tend to rise. 
However, an actual rise of prices is prevented by 
contractionary monetary policy measures. The M1 
contraction, which aims to maintain price stability, 
will cause higher interest rates. Moreover, the profit- 
ability of enterprises will be lowered by an increase of 
the real labour costs per unit of output and will affect 
the level of investment. 
At unchanged tax rates, this policy would imply a 
higher financial deficit of the German government, 
because non-wage tax revenues will decrease whereas 
interest payments on public debt will increase. Higher 
non-wage tax rates are irrational because they also 
affect the profitability of enterprises. Therefore a 
rational tax policy is likely to imply lower non-wage 
tax rates if the labour income share of enterprises 
increases. 
Because the German government is aiming at a 
constant financial deficit of the public sector, raising 
the rate of taxes on wage income is the only rational 
way to realize this. The possibility of lowering the 
necessary government expenditures needed for the 
German unification is excluded. Thus, the extra 
burden of taxation on wages will imply that disposable 
wage income does not increase, in spite of the initial 
rise in the nominal wage level. All in all, the level of 
consumption from wage income will scarcely be 
affected because of the lower prices of imports inducing 
a lower price of expenditure categories. Higher interest 
4 The same kind of consequences, and probably more realistic ones, 
could be obtained if it was postulated that the German unification 
implied extra governmental expenditures to be covered by extra 
wage taxes. These wage tax rate increases would set the shifting- 
process machine in motion which ultimately would be harmful to 
the profits of German enterprises. The latter possibility will not be 
considered explicitly in the present article. Nevertheless, financing 
the costs of the German unification provoked shifting processes 
leading to too high nominal wage levels. 
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Table 1. The downswing of the business cycle? 
In Germany: 
In the UK: 
wage impulse, tax increase and M 1 contraction 
(a) M1 contraction aiming at exchange rate stabilization of the UK pound 




Instrumental variables or impulses 
Nominal wage impulse 5/7 0 
Autonomous expenditure impulse of the public sector (in percentage points 0 0 
of GVAE) 
Rate of taxes on wage income in % of private sector primary wage income 0.5 0 
Rate of taxes on non-wage income in % of disposable non-wage income -0.8 0 
Money creation by the central bank -0.8 0 
Money creation by speculation 0 0 
Target variables or effects 
Production and employment in enterprises -0.8 0 
Price of output enterprises = price of exports 0 0 
Nominal exchange rate 0 -0.8 
Volume of private consumption - 2.3/9 0.1 
Public sector financial deficit including interest payments on public debt 0 0 
in % GVAE 
Remaining variables 
Wage and salary bill per worker in enterprises 1.0 0 
Real labour costs per unit of output in enterprises =labour income share 1.0 0 
in terms of GVAE 
Real disposable wage and salary bill per worker in enterprises -0.2 0.1 
Price of imports in terms of domestic currency -0 .4  -0 .4  
Price of expenditure categories -0.1 -0.1 
Terms of trade in % of GVAE 0.1 0.1 
Volume of exports of goods and services -0.8 0 
Volume of imports of goods and services -0 .4  0.4 
Balance on current account at constant prices in % of GVAE -0.1 -0.1 
Balance on current account at current prices in % of GVAE 0 0 
Volume of gross investment -4.7 0.1 
Stock of capital goods (volume at the end of the period) -0.235 0.005 
Production capacity of enterprises -0.8 0 
Nominal value of GVAE -0.8 0 
Nominal market value of the stock of share capital -4.8 0 
Nominal market value of long-term public debt 0 0 
Nominal value of time deposits 0 0 
Real interest rate on long-term public sector debt 0.8 0 
Yield on share capital -4 .0  0 
Real interest rate on time deposits and commercial bank loans 0.8 0 
Private sector disposable nominal income -0.52 0 
Private sector savings in % of GVAE --0.2 0 
Net investment in % of GVAE -0 .4  0 
Balance on capital account on account of share capital in % of GVAE -0.2 0 
Balance on capital account on account of public sector bonds in % 0 0 
of G VAE 
Remaining balances on capital account in % of GVAE 0 0 
Balance on capital income account on account of share capital yields 0.2 0 
and real interest revenues of public sector bonds 
Total balance of payments of the non-banking sector 0 0 
Utilization rate of production capacity of enterprises 0 0 
Balance sheet control: by definition financial components of the 0 0 
relationship between the banks, the central bank, the public sector and 
the private sector sum up to zero 
UK 






1.6/3 - 1.6/3 
- 0.8 (0.8) b 
0 0.8 
--0.4 0.4 


































-0 .4  0.4 
0 0 
' Period 1; impulses and effects are extra rates of growth measured in percentages. 
b Effects given in brackets concern % changes in consequence of a deliberately expansive M 1 policy. 
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Table 2. The long-term effects of too high a level of the labour income share, a rigid labour market and a price-stabilization policy in both countries. 
Variables 
Impulses 
Nominal wage impulse 
Money creation by central banks 
Effects 
Production and employment in enterprises 
Price of output enterprises 
Nominal exchange rate 
Stock of capital goods (volume at the end of the period) 
Labour income share 
Terms of trade in % of G V A E  
Germany UK 
Period 
1 ~ 1 
(a) + (b) (a) + (b) (a) + (b) (a) + (b) 
% % % % 
% % % % 
5/7 0 0 0 
- 0 . 8  -0 .12 0 -0 .12  
% % % % 
-0 .8  -0 .12  0 -0 .12  
0 0 0 0 
- 0 . 8  0 0.8 0 
( - 9.6) a (9.6) a 
-0 .23 -0 .12  -0.01 -0 .12  
1.0 0 0 0 
(l.O) a (0) a 
0.4 0 --0.4 0 
(4.8) a (-4.8)" 
aThe results given in parentheses are the cumulated extra rates of growth and explain the ultimate level as a deviation from initial trend 
value of the corresponding variable. 
rates and the lower profitability of enterprises certainly 
affect the level of consumption from non-wage income. 
However, its relatively small importance for the 
total level of private consumption will imply that 
private consumption is hardly affected in a downward 
direction. 
Only two expenditure categories remain for matching 
demand and supply in the goods market: gross 
investment and the balance on current account (at 
constant prices). Higher interest rates on commercial 
loans and a lower profitability of enterprises will lower 
the level of investment. The balance on current account 
will also be affected in a downward direction because 
of a deterioration in German competitiveness, and of 
course because the rate of decrease in the German 
level of domestic expenditures falls short of the rate 
of decrease in production capacity. At current prices, 
however, the balance on current account is not 
affected. A lower balance on current account at 
constant prices is fully compensated for by the 
improved terms of trade. 
Unemployment in Germany will increase to a 
significantly higher level and will continuously rise as 
a consequence of too low a level of investment. 
A low level of domestic investment also affects the 
German balance on capital account in a downward 
direction. However, the reverse development can be 
recognized with respect to the balance on capital 
income account. 
The total balance of payments (of the non-monetary 
sectors) will, of course, be in equilibrium in the event 
of flexible exchange rates. 
The UK as a victim 
A traditional trading partner of Germany has been 
introduced and for the quasi-empirical case in question 
this composite country is called 'the UK'. It represents 
all other countries in Western Europe in so far as they 
were or still are confronted with exchange rate 
difficulties. In this composite country the social 
partners effectuate a normal wage level that corre- 
sponds with the developments of average prices, 
labour productivity and terms of trade. Besides, the 
'UK' monetary decision unit has made a deal with the 
German authorities to peg the pound sterling to the 
mark by using monetary policy measures. This is 
because the UK is a member of the EMS in which 
the deutschmark plays the role of an anchor currency. 
Thus, UK monetary policy does not target output 
price stabilization, as German policy does, but reason- 
ably aims at stabilization of the nominal exchange rate 
of the pound with respect to the deutschmark, s 
Consequently, if the Bundesbank takes contractionary 
monetary policy measures, the Bank of England has 
to adopt a contractionary monetary policy which 
matches the constant ratio requirement of its currency 
with respect to the mark. It will also cause higher 
interest rates in the UK (see Table 1, the UK column 
(a)). 
The UK government tries to stabilize its financial 
deficit, in spite of the higher burden of interest 
5 Note that in an open economy the two monetary targets of price 
stabilization and nominal exchange rate stabilization can never be 
reached simultaneously. 
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Table 3. The upturn of the business cycle." 
In Germany: 
In the UK: 
Instrumental variables or impulses 
Nominal wage impulse 
Autonomous expenditure impulse of the public sector (in percentage points 
of GVAE) 
Rate of taxes on wage income in % of private sector primary wage income -0.5 0 
Rate of taxes on non-wage income in % of disposable non-wage income 0.8 0 
Money creation by the Central Bank 0.8 0 
Target variables or effects 
Production and employment in enterprises 0.8 0 
Price of output enterprises = price of exports 0 0 
Nominal exchange rate 0 0.8 
Volume of private consumption 1.4/9 0 
Public sector financial deficit including interest payments on public debt 0 0 
in % of G VAE 
Remaining variables 
Wage and salary bill per worker in enterprises -1.0 0 
Real labour costs per unit of output in enterprises = labour income share in - 1.0 0 
terms of GVAE 
Real disposable wage and salary bill per worker in enterprises 0.1 0 
Price of imports in terms of domestic currency 0.8 0 
Price of expenditure categories 0.2 0 
Terms of trade in % of GVAE -0.2 0 
Volume of exports of goods and services 0.8 0 
Volume of imports of goods and services 0 0 
Balance on current account at constant prices in % of GVAE 0.2 0 
Balance on current account at current prices in % of GVAE 0 0 
Volume of gross investment 4.6 0 
Stock of capital goods (volume at the end of the period) 0.23 0 
Production capacity of enterprises 0.8 0 
Nominal value of GVAE 0.8 0 
Nominal market value of the stock of share capital 4.8 0 
Nominal market value of long-term public debt 0 0 
Nominal value of time deposits 0 0 
Real interest rate on long-term public sector debt -0.8 0 
Yield on share capital 4.0 0 
Real interest rate on time deposits and commercial bank loans -0.8 0 
Private sector disposable nominal income 0.52 0 
Private sector savings in % of GVAE 0.2 0 
Net investment in % of GVAE 0.4 0 
Balance on capital account on account of share capital in % of GVAE 0.2 0 
Balance on capital account on account of public sector bonds in % of GVAE 0 0 
Remaining balances on capital account in % of GVAE 0 0 
Balance on capital income account on account of share capital yields and -0.2 0 
real interest revenues of public sector bonds 
Total balance of payments of the non-banking sector 0 0 
Utilization rate of production capacity of enterprises 0 0 
Balance sheet control: by definition the financial components of the 0 0 
relationship between the Banks, the Central Bank, the Public Sector and 
the Private Sector sum up to zero 
negative wage impulse, tax decrease and M 1 expansion 
(a) M1 expansion aiming at exchange rate stabilization of the UK pound 
(b) and subsequently appreciation of the UK pound by using money contraction aiming at price stability 
Germany UK 
(flexible price model) 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
-- 5/7 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 





































a Period impulses and effects are extra rates of growth measured in percentages. 
p a y m e n t s  o n  g o v e r n m e n t  debt ,  us ing  n o n - w a g e  tax  
pol icy  measures .  T h e  l a t t e r  po l icy  ac t ions  a re  a l so  
t a k e n  in G e r m a n y .  But  in this coun t ry ,  w a g e  tax  po l icy  
m e a s u r e s  a re  p re fe r red  because  the  n o n - w a g e  i n c o m e  
share  has  a l r e ady  been  decreased .  
T w o  poss ib i l i t ies  can  n o w  be discussed.  T h e  first 
case conce rns  the  s t icky pr ice  r eg ime  in the  g o o d s  
m a r k e t  o f  the  U K  a n d  the  s econd  case  is re fer red  to  as a 
d o m i n a n t  f lexible pr ice  r eg ime  in this  coun t ry .  T h e  
first poss ib i l i ty  impl ies  t ha t  the  degree  o f  u t i l i za t ion  
of  p ro f i t ab le  p r o d u c t i o n  capac i t y  m a y  be  l o w e r  t h a n  
100%;  this  is because  pr ices  a re  n o t  f lexible  enough .  
In  the  f lexible  pr ice  case, pr ices  a re  f lexible a n d  in the  
p resen t  p a p e r  they  are  e v e n  i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y  flexible. 
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Table 4. The Ioag-term effects of  a low level of the labour income share, a rigid blNmr market and • price stabilization policy in both countries." 
Variables 
Impulses 
Nominal wage impulse 
Money creation by central banks 
Effects 
Production and employment in enterprises 
Price of output enterprises 
Nominal exchange rate 
Stock of capital goods (volume at the end of the period) 
Labour income share 
Terms of trade in % of GV.4E 
Germany UK 
Period 
1 oo 1 
(a) + (b) (a) + (b) (a) + (b) (a) + (b) 
% % % % 
% % % % 
- 5/7 0 0 0 
0.8 0.12 0 0.12 
% % % % 
0.8 0.12 0 0.12 
0 0 0 0 
0.8 0 -0 .8  0 
(9.6)' (-9.6)" 
0.23 0.12 0.01 0.12 
- 1.0 0 0 0 
(-- 1.0)" 0 0 
--0.4 0 0.4 0 
(-4.8)" (4.8)" 
a The results given in brackets concern the cumulated extra rates of growth and explain the ultimate level as a deviation from initial trend 
value of the corresponding variable. 
It is easy to understand why the sticky price case 
is to be preferred to the flexible price regime in the 
case of a threatening underutilization of production 
capacity. A lower actual level of production than 
production capacity would allow is always possible. 
However, in the second case of impending over- 
utilization of production capacity, the postulate of the 
flexible price regime is to be preferred because a higher 
level of production than profitable production capacity 
allows is useless. 
The positive wage impulse and the subsequent 
contractionary policy measures initiated by Germany 
are the main causes of the recessive effects in the UK. 
Moreover, since the latter country maintains exchange 
rate stability with respect to the DM, it will be 
confronted with additional recessive effects. So, it is 
obvious that the latter country is dealing with the 
sticky price regime. 
The distinction between sticky price and flexible 
price regimes is not important from the German policy 
makers' point of view because their monetary policy 
measures are aimed at stabilization of the domestic 
prices of production. Together with a lack of wage 
costs determinants in the price formation equation, it 
implies that the domestic results of the German policy 
measures are the same for both alternatives of price 
formation in the goods market. 
The (additional) recessive effects in the United 
Kingdom can be explained in more detail as follows. 
The necessary UK contractionary monetary policy 
implies a significant slowdown of production as a 
result of the postulated sticky price model. The low 
value of 1 for the elasticity of the output price with 
respect to the utilization rate of production capacity 
implies, moreover, decreasing nominal wages and 
prices. In percentage terms, their decreases equal the 
decrease of production. The latter percentage amounts 
to half of the M 1 contraction percentage effectuated 
by the UK monetary authorities aiming at exchange 
rate stabilization of the UK pound. 
The UK competitive position improves and the 
imports from Germany decrease as a result of the 
slowdown of production. A positive balance on current 
account (at constant prices) will finally be realized, in 
spite of decreasing exports to Germany. However, the 
balance on current account at current prices will be 
unchanged in consequence of the deterioration of the 
UK terms of trade. 
The combination of a significant slowdown of total 
demand and production in the goods market and a 
positive UK trade balance implies that two expendi- 
ture categories are seriously affected by the UK 
contractionary monetary policy ie, those of private 
consumption and private investment. This is not only 
due to the higher interest rates. The seriously decreased 
purchasing power in the UK domestic goods market 
can be considered as an even more important reason. 
The latter deterioration has been caused by an 
insufficient decrease of the price of expenditure 
categories compared with the significant decreases of 
the UK nominal wages and non-wages. 
The foregoing analysis indicates why the UK has 
explicitly become a victim of its own political conduct 
by sticking to the promise of keeping the exchange 
rate of the UK pound constant with respect to the 
deutschmark. This is especially true if Germany, as an 
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anchor country, takes contractionary monetary policy 
measures exclusively aimed at its national policy 
targets. 
A devaluation of the UK pound 
Although the domestic prices of expenditure categories 
will decrease in both countries (in Germany because 
of lower prices of imports and in the UK because of 
lower output prices) the public demand for a devalua- 
tion of the UK pound will become louder. The 
resulting change in the exchange rate may stop the 
process of negative growth and will surely be a realistic 
alternative since the UK is confronted with the sticky 
price regime in the goods market (see Table 1, 
Germany, column (b) and the UK, column (b)). There 
are two possibilities for effecting a devaluation of the 
UK pound with respect to the deutschmark. 
The first possibility consists in expansionary M1 
policy measures that are consciously taken by the 
Bank of England. (Note that in the present example 
these policy measures are taken after the period 
during which the Bank of England has pursued a 
contractionary M1 policy aiming at exchange rate 
stabilization of the UK pound.) 
However, in order to realize this possibility, the UK 
authorities must first convince the German authorities 
of its profitability for both countries. As stated, it is 
easy to understand why it may be profitable if the 
sticky price regime dominates the UK goods market. 
Under such circumstances, the devaluation of the UK 
pound will cause higher levels of production in the 
UK. They are profitable, too, for the private expendi- 
ture categories in Germany because they are partially 
transmitted by an improvement in the German terms 
of trade. However, it also means that German competi- 
tive power decreases again. German exports will 
initially decline, but afterwards they will return to 
their initial level since higher UK production levels 
will induce higher UK imports equalling higher 
German exports. 
There is no need to mention all the reasons why the 
UK authorities will wait to ask the necessary permis- 
sion of the German authorities for actually carrying 
out such a profitable devaluation. If speculative agents 
consider this waiting period too long, they will aim at 
speculative profits and may successfully realize them 
if the Bank of England's foreign reserves fall short of 
the speculative agents' demand for the deutschmark. 
This second possibility of the pound's devaluation has 
been made possible by the Bundesbank authorities. 
Their lack of sufficient financial help to the Bank of 
England may be the only reason why the UK foreign 
currency reserves could be exhausted by speculation. 
Under these circumstances, speculative actions are 
morally allowed. This conclusion certainly holds if the 
UK monetary authorities wait too long before acting 
in order to change the exchange rate. If a fixed 
exchange rate causes a heavy stagnation, a flexible 
change of this rate can be a useful (partial) solution 
for all partners. 
Apart from expansionary M 1 policy measures taken 
by the central banking authorities (or an extra short- 
term lending policy by the governmental authorities), 
speculation can be a proper source of money creation. 
The percentage rate with regard to successful 
'speculative' devaluation equals that of its money 
creation. Even so, their values are essentially unknown. 
For convenience sake, they could be fixed on the same 
level as one could derive from the depreciation 
percentage of the UK pound in the event of a 
deliberate UK policy of non-monetary intervention as 
a direct response to the Germany policy action. If 
immediately (and, of course, in the absence of a 
speculative intervention) the earlier promise to peg the 
pound to the deutschmark is broken, the results of a 
non-monetary intervention would equal those which 
can be derived by adding up the 'two-step' results of the 
present active monetary intervention as denoted in the 
(a) and (b) columns of Table 1. 
The two (a) columns of Table 1 show why a fixing 
of nominal exchange rates will be unprofitable for the 
UK as well as for Germany. What will happen if the 
UK monetary authorities still decide to change their 
earlier course and consciously effect a devaluation of 
the UK pound is shown in the two (b) columns of 
Table 1. The effects of various impulses on endogenous 
variables in period 1 correspond strikingly with the 
recent downswing of the European business cycle. It 
is not the percentage values of the variables which are 
important, but their signs. Our qualitative way of 
arguing depends on these signs. They may be positive, 
negative or zero. 
Moreover, the results roughly indicate why under 
specific circumstances a successful devaluation by 
speculative operations on the foreign exchange market 
can also be profitable for both countries. 
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned possibilities 
of the pound's devaluation and the subsequent money 
creation in the UK ultimately do not affect the 
quantity of money in Germany. Thus, the usual 
Bundesbank inflation arguments for refusing the 
necessary credit facilities to the Bank of England do 
not hold. 
Obviously, the central banks' weakness is the only 
reason why they have to take their losses when a 
devaluation occurs due to the speculative agents on 
the foreign exchange market. 
Nevertheless, a devaluation only appears to be a 
partial solution for the European troubles, as we have 
observed. 
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The policy scheme for an upturn of the European 
business cycle 
Now that the causes of the downswing of the European 
business cycle have been discussed, the reversed signs 
of the impulses and the results shown in Table 1 may 
roughly outline the necessary policy measures to be 
taken for an upturn of this business cycle. In addition 
they also indicate what would have happened if market 
forces had not failed to function in the event that 
unemployment was increasing. However, unlike policy 
measures, market forces obviously need a longer 
period of time to effectuate an upturn of the European 
business cycle. 
Table 3 provides a policy scheme that is probably 
useful for an integral European solution. It denotes 
the necessity of a strong coordination of price, wage, 
budgetary and monetary policy by the EC authorities. 
In particular, the combination of moderated nominal 
wages, lower tax rates, unchanged financial deficits of 
the EC governments and expansionary monetary 
policy measures seems to be the only realistic policy- 
mix in order to initiate the necessary upturn of a 
European business cycle. 
The impulses and results denoted in Table 3 are 
only partially mirror images of the Table 1 figures. In 
the present case it is assumed that the UK again 
participates in the European exchange rate system. 
Furthermore, a switch has been made from the sticky 
price regime to the flexible price regime in the goods 
market. Consequently, as early as the first moment of 
period 1, the UK production capacity is fully utilized 
as a result of previous devaluations of the UK pound. 
From the moment the German authorities start 
carrying out their policy scheme for recovery, the UK 
authorities will initially react by taking expansionary 
monetary policy measures, aiming at a decrease of 
interest rates, in order to maintain exchange rate 
stability. However, lower interest rates will cause a 
still higher demand for goods and services, which does 
not match the UK capacity of production. Thus, prices 
and nominal wages tend to increase in the UK, which 
can be prevented by an appreciation of the UK pound. 
To this end, the UK will break the fixed exchange rate 
arrangement once again. 
The necessary appreciation of the UK pound can 
easily be effectuated by cancelling the planned expan- 
sionary money creation. Insofar as extra money has 
been created already, contractionary monetary policy 
measures are taken in order to neutralize the initial 
money creation. From column (b) of Table 3 it can be 
seen that neither in Germany nor in the UK will 
volumes change and, thus, contrary to nominal values, 
volumes will keep their original favourable levels, as 
denoted already in column (a) of Table 3. It goes 
without saying that in the present example a flexible 
exchange rate arrangement is useful because inflation 
can be brought down, whereas volumes are not 
affected in the UK. 
Thus, after a downswing, the effectuation of an 
upturn of the European business cycle is a genuine 
chance for European policy makers. Admittedly, of 
course, even imperfectly functioning labour markets 
will eventually be able to realize a similar upturn. 
However, this will only happen if the rate of un- 
employment reaches a sufficiently high level. 
From a theoretical point of view, a quick recovery 
will be possible by carrying out the policy-scheme of 
Table 3. However, from a practical point of view, 
policy makers only take action with a certain delay 
when market forces are sluggish. When an upturn has 
been set in motion, it will remain difficult afterwards 
to identify its initiator: was it the autonomous 
policy-decision unit or was it the endogenous market 
mechanism? 
The long-term effects in the event of a rigid labour 
market 
The long-term results of the analysis, as shown in 
Table 2, indicate what will happen in Germany and 
the UK if both labour markets permanently remain 
rigid. In addition, from a qualitative point of view the 
same figures also indicate the fate which other EC 
countries will have to share with them. Rigid labour 
markets imply sustained excessive labour income 
shares from the initial period in which these excessive 
shares are effected. In spite of the continuously rising 
unemployment rates, they will remain unchanged. 
In the present example a flexible exchange rate 
system is postulated which allows the two central 
banks to stabilize their domestic prices of production, 
regardless of the consequences for the nominal 
exchange rate of their domestic currencies. In the latter 
case and as a consequence of a continuously decreasing 
capacity of production, the monetary policy has to be 
a permanently contractionary one. The initial high 
negative rate of growth of the German production 
capacity will gradually adapt itself to its trend value, 
whereas the reverse development takes place in the 
UK. Ultimately, in the very long run of course, both 
countries will be confronted with the same negative 
rate of growth of their capacity of production. 
In the present example, German positive wage 
impulses have initiated this overall process of stagna- 
tion. The UK will not be able to protect itself against 
this development, in spite of its rational wage policy. 
In the long term the nominal exchange rates will 
stabilize and imply an ultimate depreciation of the UK 
pound, whereas the deutschmark will ultimately 
appreciate. 
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Between the initial and the final periods of analysis, 
the process of adaptation shows a continuously 
depreciating UK pound at a rate which corresponds 
with a lower UK speed of monetary contraction 
compared with that of the Germans. This process of 
adaptation can be understood by pointing out again 
that the UK negative rate of growth of production 
falls short (in the short and the medium term) of the 
corresponding negative rate in Germany. 
The consequences of these events ultimately imply 
definitively deteriorated terms of trade for the UK 
and, of course, the reverse situation is true for 
Germany. Because these terms of trade will compen- 
sate the balances on current account at constant prices 
for both countries, the corresponding balances on 
current account at current prices will always remain 
constant. 
All in all, the foregoing analysis should make it clear 
that the EC countries are confronted with very poor 
prospects for the future if the European markets 
and/or coordinating EC authorities fail to operate 
alternatively in the way denoted in Table 4, in which 
the long-term effects of a permanently low level of the 
labour income share in case of rigid labour markets 
are considered. Under the latter circumstances, both 
countries will still be the gainer by a policy-mix of 
moderated wages, tax decreases and M 1 expansions, 
deliberately initiated by the German authorities. 6 
Within the framework of flexible exchange rates the 
central banks in both countries may successfully take 
price-stabilization policy measures once again. But, in 
this case, they will remain confronted with equally 
positive extra rates of growth of production and 
employment. 
However, it goes without saying that both possibili- 
ties of a persistent increase or a persistent decrease of 
the rate of unemployment will never be accepted, 
neither by the authorities nor by the market forces. 
Thus, day to day reality provides for the natural rule 
to the effect that a downswing has to be followed 
unavoidably by an upturn of the business cycle. The 
6in the Netherlands a similar idea was launched twelve years 
ago under the name of the Hollands Glorie Scenario or the Schouten 
Plan (Schouten [ 12]). This was a combination of moderated nominal 
wages, lower tax rates and an unchanged financial deficit of the 
public sector and must be considered as a supply-side policy mix 
causing a significant upturn as from the first period it has been 
applied. However, in view of the fact that the latter policy mix may 
cause an initial excess of capacity of production, a simultaneous 
demand-side policy of money creation has to be pursued. In view 
of the fact that permanently higher rates of growth of investment 
and production capacity are effectuated, continuously increasing 
and, eventually, permanently higher rates of growth of production 
and employment will be realized. What is more, the volume of 
disposable wage income does not change in the initial situation, 
despite the negative nominal wage impulse. Indeed, shortly there- 
after, the volume of disposable wage income will continuously 
increase. 
downswing will normally be caused by an unexpected 
historical event that has taken place. In the present 
analysis the German (re)unification is considered as 
such an unexpected historical event. The oil crises in 
the 1970s represent other examples of how other 
downswings in the European business cycle have been 
caused. 
In conclusion, attention has to be paid to the 
first-period scheme of Table 4, with respect to 
Germany, as a clever way of action for a small open 
country (eg the Netherlands) aiming at a recovery on 
its own force. In the Netherlands a similar policy 
scheme was launched 12 years ago under the name of 
the Schouten Plan [12]. Contrary to this old version, 
the present version of the Schouten Plan also implies 
a depreciation of the domestic currency to be effectu- 
ated by a deliberately expansionary monetary policy. 
Moreover, this way of policy making will not have 
'beggar thy neighbour' effects, as we have seen already 
in the large open country case. Contrary to the 
two-country results, the active small open country will 
only be able to realize higher absolute levels of 
economic activity, but not higher levels of its rates of 
growth. However, if a sufficiently high number of 
(small) European countries simultaneously pursue the 
Schouten Plan, extra rates of growth can still be 
realized to the same extent as they are observed in the 
present two-country case. 
Concluding remarks 
The central issue in this paper concerns the influence 
of exchange rates on the European business cycle. 
Using a quasi-empirical two-country model, results 
have been derived which correspond strikingly with 
the poor economic performance Western Europe has 
shown since the early 1990s. The analysis started by 
elucidating why the European foreign currency market 
was in severe turmoil for the last two years and, 
perhaps, will also stay within the framework of an 
unstable European Monetary System in the future. 
Financing the costs of German (re)unification provoked 
too high nominal wage levels. In order to protect price 
and governmental financial deficit stability, German 
tax increase and M 1 contraction policy measures had 
been taken. This combination of an autonomously 
induced positive wage impulse and the consciously 
taken tax increase and M 1 contraction policy measures 
set the recessive movement of the German economy 
in motion. The analysis also showed how the down- 
swing of the European business cycle was initiated by 
this German policy. Consequently the Bank of 
England had to take monetary policy measures that 
matched the constant ratio requirement of its currency 
with respect to the Germany currency and actually 
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implied that the UK had to follow the German 
contractionary monetary policy. In the case of the 
postulated sticky price regime in the UK goods 
market, the UK was also confronted with stagnation 
and became a victim of its own political conduct by 
sticking to the promise of keeping the exchange rate 
of the UK pound on a par with the deutschmark. 
The analysis first suggested a partial solution for 
the European troubles by consciously effecting a 
devaluation of the UK pound or, under specific 
circumstances, by a successful devaluation caused by 
speculative operations against the UK currency. 
However, an integral solution, aiming at an upturn of 
the European business cycle, will consist of a strong 
coordination of moderated nominal wages, lower tax 
rates, unchanged financial deficits of the EC govern- 
ments and expansionary monetary policy measures 
taken by the EC authorities. If this coordination does 
not materialize and/or the European markets, in 
particular the labour markets, fail to function properly, 
the EC countries will be confronted with very poor 
economic performances in the future. 
Finally, the analysis showed the benefits of flexible 
exchange rates in the case of rigid EC labour markets. 
They could play a very useful role in hampering the 
downward movement of real welfare in the downswing 
of the European business cycle. Moreover, the analysis 
indicated that the flexible exchange rate system could 
play a useful role in lowering the EC inflation rates 
in the case of an upturn of the European business 
cycle. The last-mentioned conclusions remain true in 
the event of EC labour markets permanently staying 
rigid. 
All in all, the analysis elucidates why politicians 
actually have fundamental reasons to question the 
usefulness of a European Monetary Union within a 
framework of fixed exchange rates. The pros of the 
latter system are probably outweighed by the cons. 
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Appendix 1 
Ratios and elasticities of the stationary equilibrium state 
Ratio of private consumption to G VAE 
~=0.9 (23) 
Ratio of gross investment to GVAE 
#ih = O. 1 (24) 
Labour income share (ratio to NVAE) 
8 
L = ~ 125) 
Labour income share (ratio to GVAE) 
~=0.8 (26) 
Substitution elasticity with respect to 
speculative money 
,;o = 1 (27) 
Ratio of imports or exports to GVAE 
/~=0.25 (28) 
Expenditure elasticity of imports 
/~, = 1 (29)  
Substitution elasticity oJJbreign produced 
goods with respect to home produced 
goods 
a = 1 (30) 
Economic Modellinq 1995 Volume 12 Number 1 49 
Exchange rates and the European business cycle: P J F G Meulendijks and D B J Schouten 
Competitive price elasticity belonging to 
(29) 
r/' = a(1 - / ) )=0 .75  (31) 
Output elasticity o f  imports 
/~r- - -  = 2 (32) 
1-2 ux 
Competitive price elasticity belonging to 
(32) 
q' 
= = 1.5 (33) 
l - 
If we postulate 
2q - 1 = t~r 
it is true that 
Sb = / ~ ( -  2~ + p J  
If we also postulate 
q~=l 
the reduced form of a few fundamental  
equations can be expressed in a very 
simple way. 
Actual stock-value o f  share capital 
K * = E - 4 w '  
Yield on actual stock-value o f  share 
capital." 
r* 
- -  = - -  4w' 
P 




The G VAE-value : 
Y = E  
Accelerator 
(=0 .05  (34) 
Shares o f  domestic and foreign holdings 
o f  financial assets in total domestic 
financial assets respectively 
a=0 .5  
(1 - a ) = 0 . 5  (35) 
Capital output ratio 
= 2 (36) 
Ratio o f  total long-term lending to the 
public sector to GVAE 
d~ = 1 (37) 
Ratio M1 to GVAE 
1 
;~ = - (38) 
3 
Ratio o f  scrapping o f  technically obsolete 
capital goods to GVAE 
~t~=O.1 (39) 
Elasticity o f  the output price with respect 
to the utilization rate o f  production 
capacity 
= 1; go (40) 
Yield on share capital and real interest 
rate on public sector debt, after tax 
1 
= (1 - ¢R)¢' = - -  (41) 
30 
Rate o f  taxes on non-wage income 
1 
"~R = - (42) 
3 
Yield on share capital and real interest 
rate on public sector debt 
~'=0.05 (43) 
Ratio of  taxes on non-wage income to 
GVAE 
1 
fd~r ~ = - -  (44) 
30 
Ratio o f  interest payments on public debt 
to GVAE 
1 
cbP = - -  (45) 
30 
Effect o f  the burden o f  taxation on wage 
formation 
4 
e = - (46) 
7 
Elasticity o f  production capacity with 
respect to real labour costs per unit o f  
output in enterprises 
~b 2 " ,  = 0.8 (47) 
1 - Z ,  
Ratio o f  disposable non-wage income to 
G VA E = ratio o f  consumption o f  non- 
wage income earners to GVAE 
(~ + cb)f = 0.1 (48) 
Appendix 2 
Sensitivity analysis  with regard to three major coefficients of  the two-country model  
The  w a g e - f o r m a t i o n  coeff ic ient  
gl k and the  final equat ion  o f  the 
s y m m e t r i c  t w o - c o u n t r y  m o d e l  
If country A and country B are governed 
by the same price regime in their goods 
markets (for instance by the flexible 
price regime (~= go) in the long-term 
cases of Table 2 and Table 4), the final 
equation in terms of the two-country 
sum (total) of real production reads 
(y~ + yb) _ [2 - 0.8flk](y" + )P)_ t 
+ (Y~+g ' ) -2  
= 
at bt + 0.56(Ap7 + Ap~)_ 1 
As a second-order linear difference 
equation, its characteristic equations or 
rather its inherent stability, periodicity 
and amplitude (damping characteristics) 
may differ along with a sensitivity 
analysis (numerical variation) of the 
wage-formation coefficient (ilk). Setting 
its value equal to 1.25, a regular business 
cycle movement will be obtained, with a 
periodicity of six years. If 0 < p~ < 1.25 
this periodicity will increase. In all these 
cases labour-market rigidity does not 
exist. Note that country B is eventually 
confronted with the same business cycle 
movement as will be the case with 
country A in consequence of the uni- 
lateral wage impulse initiated by the 
latter country. 
However, for the European case, the 
present paper deals with rigid labour 
markets ie flk = 0. Therefore, the model 
can be reduced to a first-order linear 
difference equation and reads 
(Ay ~ + Ay b) = o, ~, - 0-8(PZ + eL)  
The latter equation indicates a persistent 
and negative extra rate of growth of real 
production at the value of 0.24% in the 
long term. It can be effectuated by a 
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positive wage impulse at the value of 
5/7% or by a positive budgetary impulse 
of the public sector at the value of 1%. 
These alternative impulses are supposed 
to have been caused simultaneously by 
the authorities of the two countries. 
(For both countries the definition of 
under (18) holds. In the long term 
Ay" = Ay b = - 0.12 in Table 2. Note that 
country B will also be confronted 
with the same persistent and negative 
extra rate of growth of production as 
will be the case with country A in 
consequence of a unilaterally initiated 
wage impulse by the latter country. But, 
of course, the same authorities will 
never accept such, probably unexpected, 
long-term results. Hence, when the 
labour markets refuse to function, the 
authorities will eventually take con- 
tractionary wage or budgetary policy 
measures. Thus, in spite of the fact that 
ilk=O, the growth rates of production, 
employment etc will change their course 
in an opposite direction within the not 
too distant future by intervention of 
the policy-makers. (In the long term 
Ay a = Ay b = 0.12 in Table 4). However, 
as we have explained above, it goes 
without saying that, likewise the former 
possibility, the latter possibility of a 
persistent extra increase of production 
(= a persistent extra decrease of un- 
employment) can never be maintained 
by the policy-makers. Thus, day to day 
reality provides for the natural law- 
abiding rule to the effect that a down- 
swing has to be followed unavoidably 
by an upturn of the business cycle and 
vice versa. 
Sensitivity results with regard to 
the capital-labour elasticity of 
substitution coefficient ¢b 
The table results in 1-4 have been based 
on a relatively low value (0.8) of the 
elasticity of production capacity with 
respect to real labour costs per unit of 
output in enterprises in consequence of 
a relatively low value (0.1) of the 
capital-labour elasticity of substitution 
(see (47) in Appendix 1). An exercise 
with nominal wage impulses and using 
still lower values for these elasticities 
will deliver less pronounced effects with 
regard to the levels of production and 
employment. Contrary to the latter 
result, more pronounced effects with 
respect to the level of real disposable 
labour income per worker in enterprises 
will be realised. And, of course, in the 
event that higher values are attached 
to the aforementioned elasticities the 
reverse conclusions can be drawn. 
Sensitivity results with regard to 
the competitive price elasticity 
parameter 
The results, illustrated in the four tables, 
have also been based on a relatively low 
value (1.5) of the competitive price elas- 
ticity and can be justified by postulating 
low value (1.0) attached to the home 
produced-foreign produced goods elas- 
ticity of substitution (see (33) and (30) 
in Appendix 1). However, simulations 
to be based on higher absolute values 
for these parameters do not change the 
signs of the results. In short, the quality 
of the former conclusions can be main- 
tained but the magnitude of the results 
will change. In particular, smaller (posi- 
tive or negative) deviations of the terms 
of trade, which operates as a key 
variable in the two-country model, will 
occur. Generally speaking, when country 
A is unilaterally causing a recession it 
will suffer more whereas country B will 
suffer less under this misery. The reverse 
case is also true: when home country A 
is causing a recovery it will gain more 
whereas the foreign country B will 
benefit to a lesser extent from this 
profitable situation. An examination in 
more detail of the main sensitivity 
results shows the following. 
In the event of a recession caused by 
a wage explosion in country A, under 
the regime of fixed exchange rates, 
smaller positive deviations of the terms 
of trade in country A (in comparison 
with the corresponding result in the 
a column of Table 1) will now be 
obtained. Substituting Pr by P~ in 
Equation 18, subsequently larger nega- 
tive effects on potential and actual 
employment and production will be 
obtained. In comparison with Table 1, 
the initial decrease of the real disposable 
wage and salary bill in enterprises will, 
in spite of a nominal wage-explosion, 
be larger. The reverse situation applies 
for country B. Note that, under similar 
conditions of course, all the results 
of the present two-country case will 
correspond more strongly with those of 
a closed economy for which, by definition, 
the variable of the terms of trade does 
not exist. 
When a devaluation in country B 
occurs, the smaller terms of trade 
deviation (in comparison with the cor- 
responding result in the (b) column of 
Table 1) implies a smaller devaluation 
percentage of the B currency in order 
to attain full capacity utilization. A 
smaller terms of trade loss will imply a 
smaller loss of potential employment. 
Thus, the positive effects on actual 
employment and production will also 
be larger. The terms-of-trade gain in 
country A will become smaller and so 
the increase of real disposable wage and 
salary bill per worker in enterprises will 
be smaller. So these two-country results 
will again correspond more strongly 
with those of the closed economy case in 
which an expansionary monetary policy 
might be used aiming at a full capacity 
utilization under similar circumstances. 
In the event of a recovery caused by 
lower nominal wages in country A, 
under the regime of fixed exchange 
rates, the terms of trade loss will be 
lower (in comparison with the corre- 
sponding result in the first (a) column 
of Table 3). So, employment and pro- 
duction gains will become higher in 
country A. The increase of real dispos- 
able wage and salary bill per worker in 
enterprises will, in spite of a negative 
nominal wage impulse, also be higher 
in this country. Country B will be 
confronted with a lower terms of trade 
gain and lower price increases. Thus, 
the increase of real disposable wage 
and salary bill in enterprises will also 
become smaller. 
When, in the event of a full utilization 
of production capacity, the authorities 
in country B take contractionary mone- 
tary policy measures, aiming at price 
stability, the lower revaluation percent- 
age (in comparison with the corre- 
sponding result in the second (b) column 
of Table 3) will not affect the terms of 
trade. Thus, under this circumstance, 
country A does not suffer from a 
terms-of-trade loss because its lower 
devaluation percentage will be compen- 
sated by a lower price decrease of 
imports in terms of foreign currency. 
In conclusion, it must be noted that 
in addition to the foregoing sensitivity 
results with respect to three major 
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coefficients, a lot of alternative sensi- 
tivity exercises with respect to other 
coefficients of the presently used two- 
country model have been carried out. 
All of them confirm a high degree of 
robustness of the model's qualitative 
results. Besides, the presently reported 
as well as the alternative qualitative 
results remain entirely compatible with 
the recent day to day data with regard to 
the economic performance of Western 
Europe after the German reunification, 
as reported in the recent OECD and 
IMF economic surveys. So, despite the 
simulations reported being of the quasi- 
empirical kind, it appears that they fit 
the historically generated data quite 
well in the qualitative sense of the word. 
The latter conclusion remains true 
within a broad range of compatible 
parameter values to be imposed on the 
two-country model. 
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